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CERIL highlights the relationship between the EU and the UK after 
Brexit in the area of restructuring and insolvency law and seeks to 
formulate a position on the nature and content of a possible future 
instrument governing that relationship. 
 
Brexit is a serious and important development. In all fields of 
economic activity, the magnitude of the potential problems arising 
from separating four decades of unified markets is immense and 
the area of insolvency law is no exception. Brexit is very likely to 
have an impact on the recognition of UK insolvency proceedings in 
EU Member States. The same is true for the recognition of 
schemes of arrangement, which over the last number of years had 
more or less become the restructuring tool of choice for large 
European companies in financial distress. In the absence of 
applicable regulations or treaties, recognition will again become an 
issue that will have to be addressed under the domestic laws of the 
Member States. This creates a patchwork of approaches with 
sometimes uncertain outcomes. This is not in the interest of 
businesses and consumers with assets and/or liabilities spread out 
over the UK and the EU and that seek to restructure or enter 
insolvency proceedings. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This report analyses the relationship between the EU and the UK after Brexit in the area of 
restructuring and insolvency law and seeks to formulate a position on the nature and 
content of a possible future instrument governing that relationship.  
This Report focusses on the EIR Recast and how to fill the gap that will be left if, after Brexit, 
the EIR Recast will cease to apply as between the EU and the UK. The EIR Recast is not 
applicable to restructuring and insolvency proceedings concerning insurance undertakings, 
credit institutions, investment firms and other firms, institutions and undertakings to the 
extent that they are covered by Directive 2001/24/EC and collective investment 
undertakings (see Art. 1(2) EIR Recast). These entities are subject to special arrangements 
and national supervisory authorities have wide-ranging powers of intervention. Accordingly, 
the EU legislators have laid down special rules (Directives) for those entities. For this 
reason, at this stage, we prefer to focus on the impact of Brexit on the EIR Recast and 
postpone the analysis of the impact of Brexit on financial entities to a future phase, while 
recognizing that Brexit may have a similar impact on those entities. 
 
2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION 
2.1 EIR Recast  
Currently, i.e. pre-Brexit, the relationship between the UK and the other EU members 
States in the field of insolvency and restructuring proceedings is governed by the EIR 
Recast. In addition to the establishment of uniform rules on jurisdiction and applicable law, 
that instrument ensures the mutual recognition of insolvency and restructuring 
proceedings as well as the recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments. 
Recognition of restructuring and insolvency proceedings is reciprocal and automatic in 
nature. Member States may only refuse to recognise insolvency proceedings opened in 
another Member State or refuse to enforce a judgment handed down in the context of 
such proceedings where the effects of such recognition or enforcement would be 
manifestly contrary to that State’s public policy, in particular its fundamental principles of 
the constitutional rights and liberties of the individual. Finally, the cooperation and 
communication between both insolvency practitioners and courts is also regulated by the 
EIR Recast. The rules on coordination and cooperation cover both main and secondary 
proceedings against the same debtor and insolvency proceedings against members of the 
same group of companies opened in different States. In general terms, the framework set 
by the EIR Recast promotes the effective and efficient operation of cross-border insolvency 
proceedings and therefore constitutes a key element to promote the proper functioning of 
the internal market.     
4 
 
 
CERIL is an independent non-profit, non-partisan, self-supporting organisation of persons  
committed to the improvement of restructuring and insolvency laws and practices  
in Europe, the European Union and its Member States 
Illustration: a company, incorporated in England and whose centre of main interests 
(COMI) is situated in London, has an establishment in Luxembourg. Its main 
economic activity is the rental of immoveable property in Luxembourg. Pre-Brexit, 
English courts have jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings, which will be 
recognised in Luxembourg with no further formalities under the EIR Recast. English 
Law applies to the insolvency proceedings, including their effects, conduct and 
closure, unless other rules contained in the EIR Recast state otherwise. Thus, for 
example, the effects of the English insolvency proceedings on the contracts 
conferring the use of the immoveable property are governed by Luxembourg Law, 
as the law of the Member State where that property is located. Furthermore, 
Luxembourgish courts may open secondary proceedings which encompass the 
assets located in Luxembourg. The British and Luxembourgish proceedings will be 
coordinated and insolvency practitioners and courts will cooperate under the 
framework of the EIR Recast.  
 
2.2 Schemes of Arrangement  
The UK Companies Act 2006 (Sections 895-901) lays down the rules governing schemes of 
arrangement. In practise, schemes of arrangement have proven to be a very useful 
mechanism in cross-border rescue and reorganisation of financially distressed firms. They 
allow a company to obtain a compromise or arrangement with its creditors or a class of 
them, even when the company is being wound up or an administration order is in force. In 
addition to other conditions, the compromise or arrangement is sanctioned by the court 
when a majority in number representing 75% in value of the creditors, or a class of them, 
approve it. And once the scheme of arrangement is sanctioned by the court it becomes 
binding on all creditors, or the corresponding class of them, dissenting creditors included. 
The legal regime applicable to the cross-border effects of English schemes of arrangement 
is, however, unclear. Schemes of arrangement are outside the scope of application of the 
EIR Recast. They do not qualify as insolvency proceedings for the purpose of this Regulation 
(see Recital 16) and are not mentioned in Annex A. The impact of Brexit on the recognition 
of schemes of arrangement in EU Member States will therefore depend, mainly but not 
only, on the impact of Brexit on other EU instruments, such as the Brussels I Regulation 
(recast) or the Rome I Regulation. 
It has been argued that the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) should apply to the recognition of 
schemes of arrangement. Since (i) the intention of the EU legislator is to avoid any 
loopholes between these two instruments (ie, the EIR Recast and the Brussels I Regulation, 
see recital 7 of the former), (ii) and schemes of arrangement do not fall within the scope of 
the EIR Recast, there are reasons to conclude that schemes of arrangement should fall 
within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation. The recognition of the court order sanctioning 
a scheme of arrangement – crucial to bind dissenting creditors – as a judgment within the 
terms of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) is pivotal in this approach. 
Alternatively, it has also been argued by some that the Rome I Regulation may apply to the 
recognition of the contractual consequences of a scheme of arrangement insofar as this 
institution entails an amendment or novation of a contractual relationship. Article 12 Rome 
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I Regulation indicates that the law governing a contract covers the various ways of 
extinguishing the obligations deriving from it, and It has been argued that a scheme of 
arrangement could be one of these ways of extinction. According to this interpretation, an 
English scheme of arrangement could be recognised in other Member States as long as the 
contractual obligations affected by such scheme of arrangement were governed by English 
law. 
 
3 IMMEDIATE FUTURE POST-BREXIT 
3.1 A ‘no deal’ Brexit framework 
After Brexit, the EIR Recast will cease to apply between the UK and the EU.  The 
restructuring and insolvency of companies whose COMI is located in the UK will fall outside 
the scope of application of the EIR Recast. Each of the Member States, like the UK, will 
apply its own domestic laws to determine if and to what extent its courts have jurisdiction 
to open insolvency proceedings in respect of such companies and which law will apply to 
the effects of such proceedings. Proceedings opened in the UK will not benefit from 
automatic recognition in the EU. Similarly, insolvency and restructuring proceedings 
opened in an EU Member State will not benefit from automatic recognition in the UK.  UK 
courts and courts of the Member States will each apply their national rules on jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of judgment and cooperation and 
coordination of insolvency proceedings.  
We note that, according to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, any direct EU 
legislation which was operative on the date of Brexit shall, in principle, continue to exist as 
part of the UK’s domestic law. However, on 13 September 2018 the UK government issued 
a Guidance Note on the effects of a ‘no deal’ Brexit on, inter alia, insolvency: “Handling civil 
legal cases that involve EU countries if there’s no Brexit deal’. In this Guidance Note the UK 
government observes: 
“The majority of the Insolvency Regulation, which covers the jurisdictional rules, 
applicable law and recognition of cross-border insolvency proceedings, would be 
repealed in all parts of the UK. We would retain the EU rules that provide for the UK 
courts to have jurisdiction where a company or individual is based in the UK, and 
the law will ensure that insolvency proceedings can continue to be opened in those 
circumstances. But after exit, the EU Insolvency Regulation tests would no longer 
restrict the opening of proceedings, and so it would also be possible to open 
insolvency proceedings under any of the tests set out in our domestic UK law, 
regardless of whether (or where) the debtor is based elsewhere in Europe. 
UK insolvency practitioners would need to make applications under an EU country’s 
domestic law in order to have UK orders recognised there. In certain circumstances, 
some EU countries may not recognise UK insolvency proceedings, for example if 
that would prevent creditors from taking action against the assets held in that 
country. Where appropriate, insolvency practitioners may wish to take professional 
advice on the prospects of successfully obtaining recognition for a UK insolvency 
order in an EU country. EU insolvency proceedings and judgments would no longer 
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be recognisable in the UK under the EU Insolvency Regulation, but may be 
recognised under the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, which 
already forms part of the UK’s domestic rules on recognising foreign insolvencies.” 
 
In the exceptional case of the existence of a bilateral agreement, such agreement would be 
applicable again. According to the list of treaties contained Article 85 EIR Recast, that only 
happens with the Convention between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Belgium 
providing for the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
with Protocol, signed at Brussels on 2 May 1934.  
The step back is evident. The result of the EIR Recast falling away between the EU and the 
UK will be an uncoordinated and unaligned patchwork of domestic laws. This may give rise 
to conflicting solutions as regards jurisdiction and applicable law. Furthermore, the (effects 
of) recognition of UK insolvency proceedings in the EU would depend on the domestic law 
in the respective Member and vice versa. The extent to which parallel proceedings can be 
coordinated equally depends on domestic national law and, consequently, is not ensured. 
The above analysis shows four key-points of a hard Brexit: 
(i) International jurisdiction  
When the debtor’s COMI is located in the UK, UK courts and EU courts will not apply 
the EIR Recast but national law. That may give rise to conflicting solutions if that 
debtor has assets or carries out activities in other Member States and therefore this 
may provoke positive or negative conflicts of jurisdiction: main insolvency 
proceedings may be opened in different States or in no one. 
Other issues concerning jurisdiction may also be problematic in the context of a 
hard-Brexit, in particular the scope of the jurisdiction of the insolvency courts. 
According to the EIR Recast, this instrument determines the international jurisdiction 
for actions deriving from insolvency proceedings and which are closely linked with 
them (Art. 6 EIR Recast). But this only applies within the scope of this instrument. 
National laws may follow a different approach. Thus, for example, the court of a 
Member State may conclude that it has jurisdiction to deal with an insolvency-
related action under Article 6 EIR Recast, whereas a UK court may conclude 
otherwise. Two parallel proceedings with possible contradictory judgments are 
perfectly imaginable.  
(ii) Applicable law 
Certainly, the law of the State of the opening of the proceedings governs the 
insolvency proceeding and their effects. Brexit will not affect this general principle. 
Conversely, issues unrelated to insolvency law remain governed by general civil and 
commercial rules even if they arise within the context of an insolvency proceeding, 
for instance, validity of contracts. A choice for English Law as the law governing a 
contract will not be affected by Brexit even if a dispute arises in the context of an 
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insolvency proceeding. Note that EU courts will apply the Rome I Regulation even 
when the law applicable to the contract is the law of a third country. 
However, a hard-Brexit may affect the exceptions to the law of the State of the 
opening of the insolvency proceeding and the relationships between general civil and 
commercial rules and insolvency rules. Thus, for example, under the EIR Recast the 
effects of the opening of insolvency proceedings on an executory contract, e.g. the 
insolvency practitioner’s right to terminate it in the interest of the insolvency estate, 
is governed by the lex fori concursus not by the lex contractus (unless an exception 
applies), whereas national conflict of law rules may conclude otherwise and apply to 
that right the same law that governs the contract. 
The EIR Recast also contains uniform rules other than conflict of laws rules. Thus, for 
example, the return of satisfaction obtained by a creditor in a Member State other 
than the State of opening of the proceeding (Art. 23(1) EIR Recast) will no longer be 
guaranteed by the EIR Recast between the UK and the EU. The same happens with 
respect to the honouring of an obligation to a debtor instead of the insolvency 
practitioner (Art. 31(1) EIR Recast). Finally, the uniform rules about information to 
foreign creditors and lodging of claims of the EIR Recast fall away after Brexit. 
Standard forms which are very useful in cross-border cases will not be operative in 
the relations with the UK. 
(iii) Recognition and enforcement 
Brexit implies that EU judgments will be recognised in the UK under its domestic laws 
or, where applicable, bilateral treaties. At the same time, UK judgments on winding 
up, administration, bankruptcy, sequestration or voluntary agreements and the like 
will be recognised in the EU in accordance with the domestic laws of each Member 
State. Domestic law will also govern the recognition of the appointment and powers 
of the insolvency practitioner, liquidator, supervisor, administrator, official receiver, 
trustee, provisional liquidator or judicial factor. That situation is clearly a step back 
with regard to the current regime. Domestic law may not contain clear or specific 
rules for the recognition of foreign insolvency or restructuring proceedings. When 
domestic law does contain specific rules, these rules are usually more restrictive than 
the rules laid down by the EIR Recast which only contains a control of public policy. 
Apart from the UK, only 3 other Member States of the European Union have enacted 
legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. Some 
domestic laws might contain rules of recognition based on the reciprocity principle. 
In accordance with that, the judgment from a State is recognised only if that State 
also recognises judgments given by a court of the State of recognition. Fortunately, 
the precedents of cooperation between the EU and the UK may be useful to reduce 
the impact of such a clause of reciprocity. Anyway, Brexit will usually imply 
recognition under some form of exequatur proceeding, which will necessarily entail 
procedural delays, whereas the EIR (original version and Recast) successfully 
8 
 
 
CERIL is an independent non-profit, non-partisan, self-supporting organisation of persons  
committed to the improvement of restructuring and insolvency laws and practices  
in Europe, the European Union and its Member States 
abolished exequatur and was based on an automatic recognition with no further 
formalities.  
The EIR Recast in principle extends the effects that an insolvency proceeding has 
under the lex concursus to other Member States. After Brexit, it is no longer 
guaranteed that an insolvency proceeding will produce the same effects in the UK 
and the EU. Recognition of insolvency proceedings and the question whether 
recognition entails the extension of the effects of the lex concursus to the jurisdiction 
where recognition is sought, depends on the domestic laws of the State of 
recognition. Other issues concerning the recognition of insolvency proceeding might 
also be problematic, such as the exercise by insolvency practitioners of powers 
granted by the law of the State of opening or the publication in other States of the 
decision opening the insolvency proceedings or its registration in public registers. 
The valuable interconnection of insolvency registers between the UK and the EU 
provided for by the EIR Recast will, unfortunately, also be lost with Brexit. 
(iv) Cooperation between insolvency practitioners and courts  
After a no deal Brexit, it might be possible to open insolvency proceedings in respect 
of the same debtor in the UK and in the EU: both main proceedings or main and 
secondary proceedings. Even in the second case, the coordination of these 
proceedings is very important to ensure an effective and efficient outcome, but 
unfortunately will be at risk. Furthermore, the conditions for the opening of 
secondary proceedings may be different from those laid down by the EIR Recast. For 
instance, the opening of a local proceeding prior to main proceedings will no longer 
be restricted to specific requirements, such as that a main proceeding cannot be 
opened or that local proceedings are requested by local creditors or local public 
authorities. Also, the possibility of avoiding secondary proceedings through a 
unilateral undertaking given by the representative in the main proceeding may cease 
to exit.   
Furthermore, after a hard-Brexit, the cooperation and communication between UK 
and EU insolvency representatives and courts will be dramatically affected as the 
framework for the coordination of parallel proceedings set by the EIR Recast falls 
away. 
The same holds true, mutatis mutandis, in cases of corporate groups, i.e. in case of 
cooperation between main proceedings opened in respect of different members of 
the same group of companies. Although the EIR Recast is based on an entity-by-
entity approach, practice has shown the need for cooperation when the debtors 
belong to the same group. The EIR Recast has recognized the relevance of this 
cooperation at a corporate group level. Unfortunately, these mechanims of 
cooperation could be lost by a hard-Brexit. 
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3.2 Effects of UK proceedings in the EU  
The recognition of UK restructuring or insolvency proceedings in the EU will depend on the 
domestic laws of each Member State. In this respect it is important to note that, as already 
mentioned above, only a few of the EU member States have adopted the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. The result will be a fragmented situation. 
Illustration: Let’s imagine that a UK company, with its COMI also in the UK, has two 
establishments in the EU, one in Italy and another in Spain. The recognition of the 
UK insolvency proceedings in Italy and Spain will be governed respectively by the 
Italian and Spanish domestic national rules. That provokes a fragmented solution. 
Furthermore, the opening of restructuring or insolvency proceedings in Italy and 
Spain concerning the establishments in either of those Member States is not 
governed by the EIR Recast, since the debtor’s COMI is in a third country. Neither 
the cooperation with British practitioners nor the cooperation between Italian and 
Spanish representative are regulated by EIR Recast.  
 
3.3 Effects of EU proceedings in the UK  
And the same holds true with regard to restructuring or insolvency proceedings opened in 
EU member States vis à vis the UK, i.e. the recognition of these proceedings will be 
governed by UK domestic law. It is true that recognition and assistance in the UK will be 
facilitated by the fact that the UK has adopted legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. A point of concern may, however, be the application of the Gibbs-rule – briefly stated: 
English law governed debt cannot be compromised in a proceeding governed by foreign 
law - to foreign restructuring plans that also seek to restructure English law governed debt. 
Under the EIR Recast (and instruments like the Brussels I Regulation) the Gibbs rule may 
not be applied, which facilitates the effectiveness of foreign restructuring plans in the UK.  
Illustration: Let’s imagine a Dutch company has two establishments, one in Ireland 
and another in the UK. The opening of insolvency proceedings in respect of that 
company in the Netherlands (main proceedings) and Ireland (secondary 
proceedings) is governed by the EIR Recast since the debtor’s COMI is located in the 
EU. The effects in the UK are to be determined under rules of domestic law, which 
may make a global and consistent treatment of the insolvency of the debtor, either 
its restructuring or liquidation, cumbersome. Note that even if the UK courts and 
insolvency practitioners are willing to cooperate with their EU counterparts under 
the UK’s domestic laws, that may not necessarily be the case for the courts and 
insolvency practitioners in the Member States of the EU (in the absence of a legal 
obligation, as included in the EIR Recast). This introduces a significant element of 
asymmetry that will have a negative impact in practice.   
 
3.4 Pending insolvency proceedings  
It is important to keep in mind that there will be immediate problems in respect of 
insolvency proceedings that are pending at the time of Brexit. What happens with 
insolvency proceedings that commenced before Brexit but lead to the courts issuing 
decisions afterwards? This should be addressed by transitional arrangements. The 
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uncertainty and the need for transitional arrangements is illustrated by the recent decision 
in the insolvency of the Nortel group of companies not to extend the term of office of the 
administrators beyond the date of Brexit at this time. The transitional arrangements should 
also provide a solution for other matters that may be affected by Brexit, such as (i) cases 
where an undertaking within the meaning of Article 36 EIR Recast has been given by an 
insolvency practitioner in main proceedings opened in a Member State, but not yet 
approved by known local creditors in the UK or vice versa, (ii) cases where the EIR Recast is 
decisive for the allocation of rights, such as assets situated by applying the definition of 
Article 2, or (iii) cases where the direct applicability of national laws or bilateral treaties 
triggers retroactive effects.     
The issues that may arise during the transitional period may become especially difficult. In 
general terms, it is very recommendable that proceedings commenced before Brexit but 
not finished afterwards continue to be governed by EIR Recast until their closure. The 
Commission “Position Paper on Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Commercial matters”, TF50 
(2017) 9/2, of 12 July 2017, has already advanced this possibility. The first draft of the 
Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and the EU also envisages that approach. Those 
proceedings commenced under the principle of mutual trust and the application of this 
principle may be extended in time. This solution should not give rise to particular concerns 
in relation to the jurisdiction and recognition rules. Since the court opening the insolvency 
proceeding applied a common rule of jurisdiction, any control of jurisdiction is not 
necessary at the moment of the recognition of its judgment in other Member States. It 
could be sufficient that the courts of the State of recognition (UK or a Member State) 
simply checked that the court of origin (a Member State court or a UK court) applied the 
EIR Recast. 
The same holds true with regard to the applicable law. The expectations of debtors and 
creditors about the effects of insolvency proceedings shall remain fixed at the time of the 
opening of the proceeding. At that moment the EIR Recast was applicable and it should 
continue to apply even if at the time of Brexit the insolvency proceeding is not finished.  
Finally, it is very important to extend mutual trust in matters of cooperation. Cooperation 
and communication between insolvency practitioners or between insolvency courts or 
between practitioners and courts are a great achievement of the EIR Recast. An abrupt 
rupture of this cooperation may be avoided by extending that trust and the application of 
the EIR Recast to insolvency proceedings pending at the time of Brexit. 
Certain more specific issues may also be of interest:   
(i) Synthetic secondaries and the undertaking given by the insolvency practitioner  
(ii) Undertakings 
As already mentioned above, the EIR Recast envisages that the practitioner in the 
main proceeding may offer an undertaking to local creditors in order to avoid the 
opening of secondary proceedings in another Member State (Art. 36). The 
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undertaking shall be approved by known local creditors in accordance with the 
qualified majority and voting rules applicable in the Member State where secondary 
proceeding could have been opened. Issues may arise from undertakings given by 
insolvency practitioners appointed in an EU main proceeding that, at the time of 
Brexit, is waiting to be voted on by local creditors in the UK, and vice versa.  
 
 
(iii) Transitory localisation of assets 
In proceedings regulated by the EIR Recast, the localisation of assets is supposed to 
be clear and certain under the uniform rules incorporated in Article 2 and is to be 
determined at the time of the opening of the proceeding, which is also defined in 
Article 2. The establishment of common rules on the localisation of assets is very 
important, for example, in order to determine the assets belonging to the main 
proceeding and secondary proceedings respectively. Also such rules are important in 
order to ascertain whether a creditor can invoke the protection granted to rights in 
rem and reservation of title under Articles 8 and 10. Let us imagine, for example, that 
main insolvency proceedings are opened in an EU Member State before Brexit and 
territorial proceedings are opened in the UK afterwards. Conflicts may arise if English 
courts apply different rules on the localisation. 
(iv) Retroactive rules 
It is not clear that the national laws or bilateral treaties applicable after Brexit can 
trigger retroactive effects in relation to a proceeding commenced according to other 
rules, particularly, the EIR Recast. Many transitory dispositions of these national laws 
or bilateral treaties are not clear and were not designed for a situation so particular 
as Brexit. For example, it is not clear what will happen to transactional avoidance 
claims initiated before Brexit. 
(v) COMI migration  
The application of the presumptions in favour of the debtor’s COMI may be doubtful 
when the registered office of legal persons or the place of business of businessmen is 
moved from the UK to the EU within the 3-month period prior to the request for the 
opening of insolvency proceedings and during this critical period Brexit takes place. 
The same can be said regarding the movement of the habitual residence of 
consumers within the 6-month period prior to the request. According to its verbatim 
text, the EIR Recast disapplies those presumptions only in cases of movement from a 
Member State to another Member State. 
 
In any event, and even if the solution is incomplete, it is important to include  transitional 
rules, if possible, in any agreement between the EU and the UK for the transitional period 
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and to clarify that insolvency proceedings opened under the EIR Recast will continue to be 
governed by this instrument and benefit from the application of its rules, in particular with 
regard to recognition of insolvency proceedings and coordination and communication 
between insolvency proceedings.  
 
 
3.5 Other Instruments 
Not only will Brexit terminate the application of the EIR Recast as between the UK and the 
EU Member States, it will also terminate the application of the Brussel I Regulation in 
relation to the UK. Also the Rome I Regulation will cease to be directly applicable in the UK. 
As explained earlier, both regulations may also be of relevance to the efficacy of a scheme 
of arrangement in an EU context.  
Insolvency and insolvency-related judgments are enforced in accordance with the 
procedural rules laid down by the Brussels I Regulation (see article Art. 32 EIR Recast). 
Furthermore, and according to some scholars, the Brussels I Regulation may be applicable 
to other decisions not based directly on insolvency law or not closely linked to insolvency 
proceeding, such as the (court order sanctioning the) scheme of arrangement. In this way, 
judgments and decisions obtain direct recognition and enforcement with no further 
formalities, unless a refusal of enforcement is requested by the defendant (Article 46). After 
Brexit, this privileged mechanism of enforcement based on mutual trust will be 
deactivated.  
The impact of Brexit on other instruments than the EIR Recast is particularly relevant with 
respect to the scheme of arrangement. The following key-issues should be pointed out.  
(i) Jurisdiction for schemes of arrangement 
Obviously, after Brexit, English courts will not directly apply the Brussels I Regulation 
to determine their jurisdiction in relation to schemes of arrangement for non UK 
companies and therefore they will assume jurisdiction under their national rules. 
Conversely, Member States will usually apply the jurisdictional rules of the EIR 
Recast to insolvency and restructuring proceeding insofar as they are included in 
Annex A. 
(ii) Recognition of schemes of arrangement  
In case of a no deal Brexit, the Brussels I Regulation Recast will no longer be 
applicable as between the UK and the EU and therefore cannot provide a basis for 
the recognition of an English decision sanctioning a scheme of arrangement. 
Recognition of schemes of arrangement in the EU may still be possible on the basis 
of rules of domestic private international law in the Member States of the EU or, as 
argued by some, on the basis of the Rome I Regulation. 
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4 APPROACHES 
There are, in principle, three approaches to deal with a post-Brexit scenario: (i) doing 
nothing (par. 4.1), (ii) a unilateral approach (par. 4.2), and (iii) a bilateral approach (par. 4.3). 
  
4.1 Doing nothing 
One possible option would be to do nothing, which would imply that the rules of domestic 
private international law of each State would apply to cross-border restructurings and 
insolvency proceedings. As observed earlier, this would lead to a patchwork of divergent, 
unaligned and fragmented rules in the field cross-border insolvency and restructuring 
between the EU and the UK. This option is simply not recommendable.  
Conflicts of jurisdictions may arise in cases when, for instance, the debtor’s COMI is in the 
UK but the debtor has assets in Member States of the EU. Furthermore, conflict of law rules 
would differ, and the effects of insolvency proceedings could be treated in a very different 
and conflicting way from one country to another. Furthermore, regarding recognition and 
enforcement, UK insolvency proceedings may be recognised in one Member State but not 
in another or under different conditions and with different effects. Similar risks may exist 
with respect to the recognition of EU proceedings in the UK, notwithstanding the 
implementation in the UK of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.  Finally, 
the advanced and common framework provided for in the EIR Recast for cooperation and 
communication between insolvency practitioners and courts would disappear. That is not 
recommendable in case of a main proceeding that is combined with one or more territorial 
proceedings in parallel, but it is particularly pernicious in cases of corporate groups.  
Doing nothing would reduce legal certainty and create incentives for the parties to transfer 
disputes or assets from one country to another, seeking to obtain a more favourable legal 
position ("forum shopping"), or to realise their individual claims independently and 
regardless of the costs which this may entail for the creditors as a whole or to the going 
concern value of the debtor's business. The result would clearly harm the economic activity 
of EU and UK companies and persons.  
 
4.2 Unilateral approach 
A second option is to incorporate the UNCITRAL Model Law at the EU level. Assuming the 
competence of the EU to establish such a uniform regime, this would partially eliminate the 
risks associated with divergence and fragmentation. Certainly, this option is better than the 
first one. The relationship between the EU and the UK would – to a certain extent – be 
subject to common rules, i.e. the UNCITRAL framework.2 However, the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency offers a rather outdated and, in comparison with the EIR 
                                                     
2
  Note that complete harmonisation would only be achieved if the EU adopts a Regulation based on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, directly applicable in all Member States. However, at this stage, even if the adoption 
of such a EU Regulation were considered desirable, it does not seem realistic. 
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Recast, limited and less developed framework for the treatment of cross-border cases. In 
our view the enactment of EU legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency should therefore be preceded by efforts to modernise and reinforce the 
system of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, for example, by including 
conflict of laws provisions (possibly mirroring those incorporated in the EIR Recast), rules on 
the recognition of certain insolvency related decisions (e.g. in avoidance actions or 
directors’ liability and disqualification cases) and the like. 
 
4.3 Bilateral approach 
A third option, more ambitious but in our view preferable, would be to develop a bilateral 
agreement between the EU and the UK in the field of insolvency and restructuring. We 
note that bilateral agreements between individual Members States and UK are not an 
option since the Member States have transferred competence to the EU in the area of 
cross-border insolvency and restructuring. Obviously, such bilateral agreement would 
mirror, with certain safeguards, the structure and content of the EIR Recast, i.e. it would be 
a “parallel instrument”. The Lugano Convention, which basically extends the framework of 
the Brussels I Regulation vis à vis EFTA States, or the bilateral agreement extending the 
Brussels I Regulation to Denmark may be used as a model.    
In our view, developing a bilateral agreement between the EU and the UK would be the 
best solution for dealing with the relationships between the EU and the UK in the field of 
insolvency post-Brexit. In July 2018, the British Prime Minister presented to the UK 
Parliament the document “The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union” as continuation of the paper of the Department for Exiting EU “Providing 
a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework. A future partnership paper”, of 22 
August 2017. In Section 1.7, concerning socio-economic cooperation, the UK proposes to 
explore a new bilateral agreement with the EU on civil judicial cooperation, covering a 
“coherent package of rules on jurisdiction, choice of jurisdiction, applicable law and 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil, commercial, insolvency and family 
matters”. Particularly, in paragraph 148, the UK highlights that the future agreement would 
be built on “the principles established in the Lugano Convention and subsequent 
developments at EU level in civil judicial cooperation (…). This would also reflect the long 
history of cooperation in this field based on mutual trust in each other’s legal systems”.  
(i)  Danish model 
The most ambitious solution for such a bilateral instrument would be the “Danish model”, 
i.e., an agreement that simply extends the application of the EIR Recast to the UK in the 
same ways as the Brussels I Regulation (and its Recast) was extended to Denmark. Probably 
an agreement extending the EIR Recast would be the easiest solution for professionals and 
practitioners taking into account that the rules of the agreement would simply mirror the 
EIR Recast. Jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and co-operation would be very similar. 
The effects of Brexit would be substantially reduced. 
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(ii)  Lugano model 
A second option would be the negotiation of an agreement ad hoc for the cases of 
insolvency post-Brexit, i.e. the “Lugano model”. Such a specific agreement would be 
inspired by the EIR Recast but would not reproduce exactly and necessarily the same 
solutions of the EIR Recast; particular solutions and precautions may be be added. Actually, 
this is precisely the case of the Lugano model. There are differences between the Brussels I 
Regulation Recast and the Lugano Convention in matters such as spatial application in 
consumers, workers and insurance, parallel proceedings with third countries, control of the 
international jurisdiction of the court of origin. A particular agreement between the EU and 
the UK would be a good solution although it would probably be more difficult for 
practitioners and professionals since new rules will be introduced. Politically, however, the 
Lugano model seems more realistic insofar as it allows to adapt the EIR Recast regime to 
the particular situation of the UK. The principle of mutual trust that underpins the EIR 
Recast does not have the same strength vis-à-vis the UK after Brexit. 
(iii) Istanbul Convention 
Finally, a third solution may be to go back to the European Convention on Certain 
International Aspects of Bankruptcy, signed at Istanbul on 5 June 1990. However, this 
option should be ruled out. The Convention has been unsuccessful. In fact, the Convention 
has not entered into force. Neither the UK nor the EU have manifested special interest in 
this Convention. Furthermore, the Convention does not cover restructuring proceedings.  
 
In any event, since Member States have transferred competence to the EU in this field (i.e. 
cross-border insolvency and restructuring), there are good reasons to conclude that the 
agreement should be negotiated and concluded between the EU and the UK and not 
individually between the Member States and the UK.    
 
5 ADDITIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
In developing a new framework for judicial cooperation in the field of insolvency, the EU 
and the UK start from a high level of close integration and a long history of cooperation, 
also in the field of insolvency and restructuring, which undoubtedly will facilitate the 
negotiations of a future instrument.3  
 
                                                     
3
  Politically, however, the fact that there is no bilateral agreement between the EU and Denmark extending 
the application of the EU Insolvency Regulation to this Member State may be a bad precedent for a future 
instrument with the UK. Conversely, the successful conclusion of a bilateral agreement between the EU and 
UK might provide an opportunity for Denmark to conclude a similar agreement, thereby “completing the 
network”. 
16 
 
 
CERIL is an independent non-profit, non-partisan, self-supporting organisation of persons  
committed to the improvement of restructuring and insolvency laws and practices  
in Europe, the European Union and its Member States 
5.1 UNCITRAL Model Law vs a bilateral agreement 
From a policy perspective the option for a bilateral agreement is clearly better than the 
option for a unilateral approach based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border 
Insolvency.  
The UNCITRAL Model Law was a great achievement when it was adopted twenty years ago, 
but it has not been updated since and, in comparison to the EIR Recast, offers a more 
limited and less developed framework for cross-border insolvency and restructuring. It is 
silent in very relevant aspects, such as jurisdiction and conflict of laws rules. In establishing 
a new framework for cross-border cooperation and assistance between the EU and the UK, 
due attention should be given to the close links that have existed for the past decades 
between the UK and the EU. In our view, adopting a framework that is based on the 
principle of mutual trust, as embodied in the EIR Recast, is much more suitable in the 
relation between the EU and the UK than a framework that is based on a more “neutral” 
and inquisitive approach that is aimed to cover the relationship with not just one particular 
country but rather the “rest of the world”. As between the EU and the UK there is every 
reason for insolvency and restructuring cases to continue to adhere to the principle of 
mutual trust, thereby, for example, allowing for automatic recognition of insolvency and 
restructuring proceedings (and judgments delivered in the context of such proceedings) 
and allowing for elaborate obligations for insolvency practitioners and courts to cooperate 
and communicate. One should not forget that the original EIR applied since 31 May 2002 
and the EIR Recast has been in force since 26 June 2017. Therefore, by March 2019, the EU 
and the UK will have enjoyed some seventeen years of close and successful cooperation in 
matters of insolvency on the basis of the EIR (original and recast). In the field of insolvency 
and restructuring, the UK and the EU have a very relevant legal background which should 
not be lost.  
 
5.2 Economic integration between the UK and the EU 
Also, from an economic perspective, it seems clear that an approach based on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law does not cater to the needs of the EU-UK market. A close relationship 
between the UK and the EU is of mutual importance in the field of cross-border 
restructuring and insolvency since thousands of EU companies, businesses and individual 
professionals in general have established a place of business in the UK and vice versa. 
Additionally, companies and businesses across Europe have chosen English law to govern 
their affairs and English courts to rule on their disputes. And this may continue in the 
future. The EU and the UK will continue to be key trading partners and will continue to 
invest in each other’s economies. 
According to the Study “An Assessment of the Economic Impact of Brexit on the EU27”, 
prepared by the Centre for European Policy Studies and managed by the Policy Department 
on Economic and Scientific Policies for the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection of European Parliament, in 2015 the EU27’s exported goods to the UK totalled 
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€306 billion, whereas it imported €184 billion. The volume of trade in services was also 
very substantial, with €94 billion of exports from EU27 to the UK, and €122 billion in 
imports. For all firms that carry out these activities, even outside the internal market, it is 
necessary that insolvency and restructuring proceedings operate efficiently and effectively 
on the basis of a common framework in the UK and the EU. 
As the UK is a strategic place for arbitration and litigation in matters of contracts, it is very 
important that the effects of insolvency proceedings on arbitration, pending lawsuits and 
contracts are regulated in a common and clear way, both in respect of jurisdiction and 
applicable law.  
The EIR Recast provides such a common and comprehensive framework. 
 
5.3 Businesses and consumers value predictability and certainty 
A common legal framework will support business confidence to trade, and minimise the 
potential risk associated with opportunistic tactics in restructuring or insolvency situations. 
A common legal framework is the best solution post-Brexit. Businesses and consumers will 
find clear rules and can predict the effects of the cross-border insolvency and restructuring. 
A fragmented situation with different rules and legal solutions would be an obstacle to 
maximise the value of a company in insolvency or restructuring proceedings. Furthermore, 
this fragmented situation may create (positive and negative) conflicts of jurisdiction and 
implies a high risk of forum shopping practices. 
Illustration: as explained above, it is unclear what will happen when the registered 
office of legal persons or the place of business of businessmen are moved from the 
UK to, for example, Finland or from Finland to the UK within the 3-month period 
prior to the request for the opening of insolvency proceedings. The same is true for 
a transfer of the habitual residence of consumers within the 6-month period prior 
to the request for opening of insolvency proceedings. Such transfer does not imply 
a presumption of COMI in the new State according to the EIR Recast, as such 
presumption is provided for in case of a transfer to “another” Member State. The 
EIR Recast is silent as regards third countries. It could be possible that UK Courts 
and EU Courts would have contradictory interpretations and consider that the 
debtor’s COMI is simultaneously located in two States, in the UK and in a Member 
State; or in neither of them. 
 
6 STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE FUTURE AGREEMENT  
6.1 EIR Recast as basis for the agreement 
It is clear from the above that we take the view that the structure and content of the future 
instrument(s) should be inspired by the EIR Recast. But even though the EIR Recast should 
be the basis of the new instrument, it should not be applied in a rigid manner. The 
structure and contents of the future agreement must, of course, be adapted to the 
particular circumstances of Brexit.  
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Firstly, the future agreement should include transitional provisions to deal with proceedings 
initiated before Brexit but that will continue after Brexit. Secondly, substantial amendments 
in relation to the rules laid down by the EIR Recast may be included in the future 
agreement to adapt it to the new framework governing the relationships between the EU 
and the UK, i.e. cooperation but not integration. The solutions therefore may not be exactly 
the same as in the EIR Recast but shall meet the objective of the new instrument: avoiding 
conflicts of jurisdictions and divergences of conflicts of laws rules and promoting the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments and cooperation and communication between 
insolvency practitioners and courts. 
In this sense, the precedent of a data protection agreement between the UK and the EU 
could be the way to go. The Technical Note of the British Government of 7 June 2018 
reveals the benefits of a UK-EU agreement in this matter, improving legal certainty, stability 
and transparency at the level of international cooperation mechanisms.  
When designing the content of a future agreement, the following issues should be taken 
into consideration. In general terms, we note that, in drafting a new instrument due 
attention should be given to the relation between such instrument and the EIR Recast 
(which rules should be applied by the courts in the EU if, for example, a debtor has its COMI 
in the EU and an establishment in the UK?). 
(i) International jurisdiction  
Like under the EIR Recast, the debtor’s COMI should be the decisive factor for 
determining the scope of application of the instrument and the conferral of 
jurisdiction on the courts of the UK or one of the Member States.    
(ii) Applicable law 
In order to ensure legal certainty and predictability it is very important that the 
conflicts of laws regime will be exactly the same in both instruments. A possible 
approach to ensure this objective would be to include in the new instrument a cross-
reference to the conflict of law rules laid down by the EIR Recast. 
(iii) Recognition and enforcement  
The new instrument should apply to the recognition and enforcement of UK orders 
and judgments in the EU and, vice versa, the recognition and enforcement of EU 
orders and judgments in the UK. Due attention will have to be given to more complex 
situations. On the one hand, if the debtor’s COMI is situated neither in the UK nor in 
the EU, the future instrument should not be applicable. On the other hand, if the 
debtor’s COMI is situated in the EU and has two establishments, one of them in the 
UK and another in a Member State, the rules of the instrument would be applied for 
recognition in the UK and the rules of the EIR Recast would be applied for 
recognition in the other Member State. In this way, the EIR Recast should not be 
affected by the new instrument unless the negotiations of the instrument lead to 
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other solution. This underlines that the regime of recognition an enforcement of the 
new instrument should be very similar to the EIR Recast. 
(iv) Cooperation  
Like the EIR Recast, a new instrument must contain rules on the cooperation and 
communication between UK and EU insolvency practitioners and courts. The regime 
of the future instrument should apply in case the debtor’s COMI is in the UK or the 
EU. Due attention must be given to more difficult cases. Let us imagine a debtor 
whose COMI is in the UK and has two establishments in different Member States. In 
this case, the cooperation between the representatives in the two Member States 
could be governed by the future agreement and not by EIR Recast, since the debtor’s 
COMI is outside the EU. But the answer is more complex when the COMI is in the 
territory of the EU and the debtor has an establishment in a Member State and 
another one in the UK. The cooperation between the representative in the EU main 
proceeding and the representative in the EU local proceeding should be governed by 
EIR Recast. The cooperation with British representative would be governed by the 
future instrument. To avoid any inconsistency, it is thus important that both 
instruments have a similar regime.  
(v) Relation of a future agreement with other instruments  
As a result of the ratification of the future instrument by the EU, such instrument 
becomes an EU act. To avoid any uncertainty, the future instrument should include a 
provision dealing with its relationship with the EIR Recast and other EU acts.  
Also, it is interesting to consider what would happen with schemes of arrangement. 
These arrangements may be included within the future instrument, but it is also 
imaginable that they remain outside the scope of a new instrument. In this case, it 
will be relevant if the UK ratifies the Lugano Convention, since they may fall within 
the scope of this latter instrument.  
Another point of relevance concerning the Lugano Convention is the enforcement of 
judgments in matters deriving from insolvency law and closely connected with the 
insolvency proceedings. The EIR Recast refers to the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) in 
order to regulate the enforcement procedure. After Brexit, the future agreement 
could refer to the Lugano Convention if the UK joins that Convention.  
 
6.2 Role of the CJ EU 
After Brexit, the UK will no longer be subject to the jurisdiction of the CJ EU. At the same 
time, it is very important that the future instrument is uniformly interpreted in the UK and 
the EU. Conflicts of interpretation would be an undesirable result. International law 
provides rules of interpretation of international instruments. But additional solutions could 
be considered, notably following the ‘Danish’ model (see above) or the Lugano model.  
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(i) Take decisions of courts of the other States into account 
The courts should pay due account to rulings of the courts of other States bound by 
the new instrument and also to judgments of the Court of Justice. Note that paying 
attention is not the same as being bound by the case law of the CJ EU. This solution 
is actually contained in the Lugano Convention.  
(ii) Relevant similar decisions under the EIR Recast  
Any court applying and interpreting the future agreement should pay due account to 
the principles laid down by any relevant decision concerning similar provisions of the 
EIR Recast. Again, this solution is provided for by the Lugano Convention in reference 
to the Brussels I Regulation. 
(iii) Exchange of information of relevant decisions  
Similar to the Lugano Convention, a system of exchange of information concerning 
relevant judgments delivered pursuant to the future agreement could be included. 
CERIL could be a very useful mechanism for supporting the exchange of information 
about relevant decisions.  
(iv) Preliminary rulings of CJ EU 
The future agreement would be an EU Act. In principle, only the courts of Member 
States of the EU, and not UK courts, will be entitled to submit preliminary rulings to 
the CJ EU and be bound by its case law. The UK will not be bound by the jurisdiction 
of CJ EU and it would not be obliged or entitled to submit requests for preliminary 
rulings. That happens in the Lugano Convention as well. However, we note that the 
role of the CJ EU in the Agreement between Denmark and the EU is broader than in 
the Lugano Convention. Certainly, uniform interpretation similar to the Agreement 
Denmark-EU would be more advanced and show a greater degree of cooperation, 
but this option does not seem realistic vis-à-vis the UK.  
(v) Submission of statements or observations to CJ EU 
It has already been pointed out that in principle the UK courts could not submit 
requests for preliminary rulings to CJ EU nor will it be bound by its case law. But it 
may be worth considering to allow the UK, although not a Member State of the EU, 
to submit statements or written observations to CJ EU, in case of requests fo 
preliminary rulings referred by Member States with relation to the future agreement. 
That approach is also contained in the Lugano Convention.  
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